Suchergebnisse

We consider a setting where agents are subject to two types of collective action problems, any group user's individual extraction inducing an externality on others in the same group (intra-group problem), while aggregate extraction in one group induces an externality on each agent in other groups (intergroup problem). One illustrative example of such a setting corresponds to a case where a common-pool resource is jointly extracted in local areas, which are managed by separate groups of individuals extracting the resource in their respective location. The interplay between both types of externality is shown to affect the results obtained in classical models of common-pool resources. We show how the fundamentals affect the individual strategies and welfare compared to the benchmark commons problems. Finally, different initiatives (local cooperation, inter-area agreements) are analyzed to assess whether they may alleviate the problems, and to understand the conditions under which they do so.

We consider a setting where agents are subject to two types of collective action problems, any group user's individual extraction inducing an externality on others in the same group (intra-group problem), while aggregate extraction in one group induces an externality on each agent in other groups (intergroup problem). One illustrative example of such a setting corresponds to a case where a common-pool resource is jointly extracted in local areas, which are managed by separate groups of individuals extracting the resource in their respective location. The interplay between both types of externality is shown to affect the results obtained in classical models of common-pool resources. We show how the fundamentals affect the individual strategies and welfare compared to the benchmark commons problems. Finally, different initiatives (local cooperation, inter-area agreements) are analyzed to assess whether they may alleviate the problems, and to understand the conditions under which they do so.

Species' interactions and the involvement of fishermen in several fisheries may not be properly accounted for by regulatory schemes,thus making regulation suboptimal. Being the only implementable instruments, the degree of ineffciency of three second-best instruments is assessed (by using a bioeconomic multispecies model) in terms of their ability to get close to socially optimal effort and stock levels. The type of regulation and the existing biological interaction are also shown to result in different impacts on effort re-allocation: a specific regulation does not necessarily increase the pressure on the unregulated species. Finally, we discuss how the choice of which second-best policy to implement is situation-specific.

Species' interactions and the involvement of fishermen in several fisheries may not be properly accounted for by regulatory schemes,thus making regulation suboptimal. Being the only implementable instruments, the degree of ineffciency of three second-best instruments is assessed (by using a bioeconomic multispecies model) in terms of their ability to get close to socially optimal effort and stock levels. The type of regulation and the existing biological interaction are also shown to result in different impacts on effort re-allocation: a specific regulation does not necessarily increase the pressure on the unregulated species. Finally, we discuss how the choice of which second-best policy to implement is situation-specific.

Species' interactions and the involvement of fishermen in several fisheries may not be properly accounted for by regulatory schemes,thus making regulation suboptimal. Being the only implementable instruments, the degree of ineffciency of three second-best instruments is assessed (by using a bioeconomic multispecies model) in terms of their ability to get close to socially optimal effort and stock levels. The type of regulation and the existing biological interaction are also shown to result in different impacts on effort re-allocation: a specific regulation does not necessarily increase the pressure on the unregulated species. Finally, we discuss how the choice of which second-best policy to implement is situation-specific.